Industry Contagion in Loan Spreads by Hertzel, Michael G. & Officer, Micah S.
Digital Commons@
Loyola Marymount University
and Loyola Law School
Finance & CIS Faculty Works Finance & Computer Information Systems
1-1-2012
Industry Contagion in Loan Spreads
Michael G. Hertzel
Arizona State University
Micah S. Officer
Loyola Marymount University, micah.officer@lmu.edu
This Article - post-print is brought to you for free and open access by the Finance & Computer Information Systems at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Finance & CIS Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Repository Citation
Hertzel, Michael G. and Officer, Micah S., "Industry Contagion in Loan Spreads" (2012). Finance & CIS Faculty Works. 14.
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/fina_fac/14
Recommended Citation
Hertzel, M. G., & Officer, M. S. (2012). Industry contagion in loan spreads. Journal Of Financial Economics, 103493-506.
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.012
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641645
 
 
Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and acquisition outcomes 
 
Chen Lin 
Chinese University of Hong Kong 
Email: chenlin@baf.msmail.cuhk.edu.hk  
Telephone: +852 2609 8566 
 
Micah Officer 
Loyola Marymount University 
Email: micah.officer@lmu.edu 
Telephone: (310) 338-7658 
 
Hong Zou 
City University of Hong Kong 
Email: hongzou@cityu.edu.hk 
Telephone: +852 34427880 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the effect of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the 
outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives 
have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-
period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of 
D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear 
to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of 
D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the 
discipline of shareholder litigation.  
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1. Introduction 
Using a unique data set of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (hereafter referred to as 
“D&O insurance”) manually collected for Canadian firms, in this paper we examine the impact 
of D&O insurance on the outcome of corporate acquisition decisions. Both D&O insurance and 
corporate indemnification provide important layers of protection to a company’s directors and 
officers for legal liability arising from their professional activities on behalf of the company. 
Indemnification refers to the process by which companies agree to compensate executives for the 
costs of defense and/or settling lawsuits brought against them personally as a result of their 
service for the firm. Companies purchase D&O insurance to recoup these indemnification costs, 
or to provide protection when indemnification does not apply (Core, 1997, Chung and Wynn, 
2008).1 In fact, most securities class action lawsuits in the US brought by shareholders are settled 
out of court within the D&O insurance coverage limit. D&O insurance thus serves as an 
important source of funds to companies for the defense and settlement of lawsuits.  
For directors and officers, D&O insurance can provide an additional layer of protection in 
two scenarios. First, indemnification is only effective if the corporation is sufficiently solvent to 
cover the executives’ costs. If the company is insolvent, D&O insurance is the only available 
source of protection for directors and officers (Core, 1997; Boyer, 2005). Second, subject to 
corporate bylaws, a corporation can indemnify directors and officers for damages, settlement 
amounts, and legal expenses only if the directors and officers have acted in good faith and in the 
best interests of the corporation. In contrast, the most typical exclusions from D&O insurance 
coverage are suits based on deliberate fraud and illegal profit.2 As Black, Cheffins, and Klausner 
                                                            
1 A D&O policy may include the following protections: a) coverage to protect individual directors and officers 
from liability in litigation when the company is not able to indemnify them for legal reasons, due to financial 
distress, or when a firm is permitted to do so (by law and the company’s bylaws) but chooses not to (i.e., the so-
called  “Side A” coverage); b) coverage to reimburse the company for indemnity payments made to directors and 
officers when it indemnifies directors and officers for legal costs or penalties awarded against them (i.e., the “Side B” 
coverage; this coverage does not typically cover any liability the company itself may have to the plaintiff); c) 
coverage to protect the firm from the risk of litigation when the company is directly sued as a defendant (i.e., the 
“Side C” coverage). Side A coverage typically includes no deductible (loss sharing by the insured) but Side B and 
Side C often do; Side A coverage can be purchased separately (Baker and Griffith, 2007).  
2 In practice, there is little evidence of insurers contesting D&O insurance coverage offered in Canada as long as 
directors and officers do not admit to dishonesty (Cheffins and Black, 2006, p.1448). 
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(2006, p.1086) point out, “… the deliberate fraud and personal profit exclusions are considerably 
narrower than the good faith limitation on indemnification since the exclusions contemplate 
some form of actual dishonesty, whereas the good faith standard will be breached if there has 
been a ‘conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.’”3 Therefore, D&O insurance typically 
provides less restrictive protections for directors and officers than corporate indemnification does. 
Despite these subtle differences, in practice the business judgment rule sets a relatively high 
hurdle for proving breach of fiduciary duty and the risk of insolvency for many listed firms is not 
high. Therefore, whether D&O insurance exerts an impact on corporate decisions remains an 
empirical question that we explore in this study. 
We find that acquirers whose managers are protected by D&O insurance, or carry higher 
policy limits, experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns 
around merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements than do acquirers whose managers are not 
protected by D&O insurance (or carry lower policy limits). We then seek to understand why 
acquirers with D&O insurance experience lower stock returns around acquisition announcements 
by exploring two channels. First, when we examine the effect of D&O insurance on acquisition 
premiums paid by acquirers, we find that acquirers with more D&O insurance tend to pay higher 
premiums. We also examine the synergies in the M&A deals for firms with high or low D&O 
insurance coverage. Combined (acquirer plus target) cumulative abnormal announcement returns 
are lower in deals where the acquirer carries high (above sample median) insurance coverage. 
Subsequent operating performance of the merged firm also appears to be negatively related to the 
D&O insurance coverage carried by the acquirer. Together, our findings provide evidence that 
managers of firms carrying high levels of D&O insurance make poor M&A decisions (high 
premiums paid and low synergies received) that result in lower returns for their stockholders. 
However, while our study identifies one potential cost of D&O insurance in the M&A setting, it 
                                                            
3 In Canada, the Canada Business Corporations Acts (CBCA) amendments made in 2001 eliminated the “breach 
of fiduciary duty” restriction for D&O insurance coverage, which further increases the importance of D&O 
insurance to directors and officers. 
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cannot address whether D&O insurance unambiguously increases or decreases firm value. 
The purchase of D&O insurance is very common for listed companies in many common-law 
jurisdictions (e.g., the US and Canada). For example, in our sample we find that over 70% of 
acquirers carry D&O insurance coverage, and in other samples the proportion of firms covered 
by D&O insurance is even higher (see Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002). Nevertheless, there is an 
ongoing debate about the merits and costs of D&O insurance. One view is that because D&O 
insurance insulates directors and officers from the threat of litigation and personal financial 
liability resulting from their decisions on behalf of the corporation, it reduces managerial 
incentives to act in the best interest of shareholders. The other view is that D&O insurance can 
be beneficial to shareholders because the scrutiny of a firm’s corporate governance by the D&O 
insurer in underwriting provides monitoring (Holderness, 1990; Core, 2000), D&O insurers have  
comparative advantages in providing claims adjudication/settlement services (Mayers and Smith, 
1982),  D&O insurers act as deep-pocket, last-chance payers for shareholders who suffer losses 
because of managerial mistakes (Boyer, 2005), and D&O insurance can help a firm attract high-
caliber candidates as directors and officers and may reduce the compensating differential in 
executive pay (Mayers and Smith, 1982), or help lower a firm’s incidence of bankruptcy (Core, 
1997; Zou and Adams, 2008). The problems/merits of D&O insurance have received heightened 
attention in recent years amid debate about whether securities class action lawsuits should be the 
primary means of providing remedies to injured investors and reform of the class action system 
in the US (Seligman, 2004).4  
Despite the prevalence of D&O insurance and the debate about its merits, empirical evidence 
is relatively sparse due largely to the difficulty in obtaining D&O insurance data at the firm level. 
Using a proprietary sample of 72 initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US, Chalmers, Dann, and 
Harford (2002) find a negative relation between the amount of D&O insurance purchased at the 
                                                            
4 These alleged problems with D&O insurance include: the existence of D&O insurance could cause moral 
hazard among directors and officers, attract frivolous shareholder suits, and induce parties in a suit to settle out-of-
court (before proceeding to the trial) because once the defendant loses a suit, D&O insurance cannot be used to pay 
damages.  
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time of the IPO and three-year post-IPO stock returns, suggesting that managerial opportunism 
affects D&O insurance decisions. Core (1997) and Gillan and Panasian (2010a) find that 
corporate governance and managerial entrenchment are associated with D&O insurance 
decisions. Core (2000), Gillan and Panasian (2010a, 2010b), and Stern and Boyer (2010) further 
note that D&O insurance premiums vary predictably with firm-specific factors (e.g., governance 
and disclosure) affecting litigation risk. Zou, Wong, Shum, Xiong, and Yan (2008) find that 
purchases of D&O insurance in China are related to governance issues generated by controlling-
minority shareholder incentive conflicts. 
In addition to the sparse attention D&O insurance has received in the literature, these existing 
studies invariably focus on understanding the key determinants of D&O insurance purchases and 
premiums; as a result, we still know little about the effects of D&O insurance on important 
corporate decisions.5 Chalmers et al. (2002, p.633) note that further research in understanding the 
implications of a firm’s choice of D&O insurance coverage is warranted. While the nominal 
policy amounts in D&O insurance are relatively small compared to the size of the firms carrying 
the coverage (in our sample, for example, the average nominal policy limit is C$46.5 million), 
the incentive effects of D&O insurance could be substantial because the policy limits are large 
relative to the net worth of the executives that make the decisions that could result in litigation 
(and substantial expense to those executives). 
In this paper, we take advantage of the mandatory disclosure requirement of D&O insurance 
policies by listed firms in Canada and examine the effects of D&O insurance on the outcomes for 
acquirers in mergers and acquisitions (M&As).6 M&As are an interesting area in which to 
                                                            
5 Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles (1987) use a sample of 11 announcements and find a positive and marginally 
significant market reaction to D&O insurance purchases for New York-based firms. We attempt to pinpoint an exact 
channel by which D&O insurance affects directors’ and officers’ incentives and corporate decisions. Chung and 
Wynn (2008) find that higher legal liability coverage lowers the firm’s earning conservatism in financial reporting. 
Wynn (2008) reports that the liability coverage proxied by a firm’s excess cash holding appears to affect a firm’s 
disclosure of bad news in US listed Canadian companies. 
6 In contrast, US firms (except those that are based in New York) are not required to disclose D&O insurance 
information (Chalmers et al., 2002), and a search of the 10-K filings of a random sample of US firms found no 
voluntary disclosure of such information. This is not surprising given the importance of D&O insurance in 
minimizing managerial liability and that such information is often deemed to be sensitive and confidential by 
companies. 
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examine the effects of D&O insurance on corporate decision-making because M&A investment 
are often lumpy and significant for many firms. D&O insurance and M&As are also closely 
related because M&A-related lawsuits are the principal litigation risk faced by directors and 
officers in fiduciary duty suits (Core, 1997, 2000; Thompson and Thomas, 2004; Weiss and 
White, 2004). Specifically, Thompson and Thomas (2004) report that more than 80% of the 
fiduciary duty suits filed in Delaware between 1999 and 2000 are class actions against listed 
companies challenging director misconduct in M&A decisions and that acquisition-oriented suits 
are now the dominant form of corporate litigation. Furthermore, Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) 
find that about 21% of stock-swap mergers in the US between 1996 and 2002 result in litigation 
and that pre-merger abnormal accruals can predict the incidence of post-merger lawsuits, 
suggesting that irregularities in financial reporting and misconduct in M&As are often entangled 
and frequently lead to shareholder litigations. Indeed, shareholder lawsuits in our sample often 
challenge whether directors and officers conduct M&As with appropriate due diligence, the 
fairness of payment terms, and/or irregularities in disclosure regarding the deal (e.g., being 
overly optimistic or withholding important negative information). Nortel, one of our sample 
firms, was targeted by shareholders for misconduct in a series of acquisitions and financial 
misreporting. To our knowledge, however, no prior studies have examined the effect of D&O 
insurance coverage on M&A outcomes. 
If the protection of D&O insurance induces moral hazard amongst well-protected directors 
and officers, we predict that firms with substantial D&O insurance coverage are more likely to 
make poor M&A decisions. If directors and officers knowingly (e.g., for self interest), recklessly, 
or negligently make poor M&A decisions, (operational and financial) problems will likely 
surface after the merger is completed and securities class actions are often triggered by a sharp 
decline in the company’s stock price.7 This exposes directors and officers to the prospect of 
                                                            
7  Attorneys’ fees, often recoverable from a settlement, provide strong financial incentives to some 
entrepreneurial lawyers to actively commence class action lawsuits on behalf of clients (Cox, 1997). The stock price 
fall that often accompanies M&A transactions could be one of the factors that attracts such actions.  
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shareholder litigation and potential personal liability, and the existence of D&O insurance 
coverage can effectively eliminate or mitigate directors’ and officers’ personal liability for 
monetary damages to shareholders. As a result, the disciplinary effect of (potential) shareholder 
litigation is muted by D&O insurance.  
It is also important to point out that shareholder class action lawsuits do not have to be 
successful, ex post, in order to impose potential litigation risk, and exert a disciplinary effect, on 
a firm and its directors and officers. Absent a D&O insurance policy, a firm or its directors and 
officers will likely bear significant defense costs, even if the allegations are eventually found to 
be unsubstantiated. For example, Barrick Gold Corporation (a mining firm in our sample) 
reported that its D&O insurer paid annual litigation-related costs of C$0.96 million, C$4.2 
million, and C$7.7 million for the period 2006 – 2008 under their D&O insurance policy. 
Furthermore, given that lawsuits can take years to resolve, and the fact that there are substantial 
uncertainties in the resolution process, the expected cost of defense can be very high (especially 
relative to the fees a director earns for serving on the board). Therefore, if D&O insurance 
weakens the incentives of directors and officers by insulating them from the threat of litigation 
and personal liability, directors and officers protected by D&O insurance are more likely to make 
imprudent or empire-building, and hence poor, acquisitions.  
The protection afforded by corporate indemnification could make D&O insurance coverage 
less of a concern to directors and officers in corporate decision-making. After the 2001 reform of 
the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) (the federal corporate statute in Canada), a 
corporation can now indemnify a director or officer for legal expenses regardless of the outcome 
of the proceeding, as well as for amounts paid to settle or satisfy a judgment in civil, criminal, or 
administrative proceedings if a director or officer has acted honestly and in good faith, and 
subject to court approval for defense cost in derivative litigation (Cheffins and Black, 2006). In 
practice, the courts in Canada apply a “business judgment rule” when assessing whether there 
has been a breach of duty of care, and this sets a high hurdle for proving a breach of duty of care 
(Cheffins and Black, 2006, p.1442). Because of this ease of access to indemnification (especially 
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after 2001 and, therefore, during our sample period), the effect of D&O insurance on corporate 
decisions is an empirical question. 
In addition to directly contributing to the understanding of the incentive implications of D&O 
insurance, our study is also related to the line of research examining the effects of corporate 
governance on corporate M&A decisions and, more broadly, the growing literature on corporate 
governance. Harford and Li (2007) find that chief executive officers (CEOs) reap personal 
benefits from making acquisitions even when these acquisitions have poor outcomes for 
stockholders. Masulis et al. (2007) report that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions, and 
hence less discipline from the market for corporate control, experience significantly lower 
announcement-period abnormal stock returns, while Harford, Humphèry, and Powell (2010) 
show that firms with entrenched managers tend to acquire targets with low synergies. Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001) provide evidence that governance mechanisms (e.g., 
executive stock options) that effectively align shareholder-manager incentives lead to more 
profitable acquisition decisions.  
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we describe the disclosure 
of D&O insurance information in Canada, data collection, and the sample. Section 3 describes 
the key variables and their summary statistics. Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data and sample selection 
We use a sample of Canadian companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) 
because Canada legally mandates companies to disclose information concerning D&O insurance 
purchases. To keep the manual data collection manageable, we focus on constituent firms of the 
TSE 300 Index (currently S&P/TSX Composite Index) for the period 2002 – 2008. The TSE 300 
Index is the most representative stock index in Canada and its inclusion criteria include firm size 
and the trading liquidity of the stock. We identify companies that appear at least once in the TSE 
300 Index. We then hand-collect D&O insurance information from the companies’ proxy 
circulars filed in the SEDAR database (available at www.sedar.com). Available information 
about D&O insurance includes whether or not a firm has D&O insurance in a given year, and the 
personal and corporate coverage indemnity limits, premiums, and deductibles. Personal and 
corporate indemnity coverage are equal and there is no personal deductible in the majority of 
cases. A D&O policy is typically valid for one year and renewable thereafter (subject to mutual 
agreement). The policy coverage period may not coincide with the reporting fiscal year. In such 
a case, we take care to map D&O policies into the corresponding fiscal year by calculating the 
(time weighted average) amount of coverage limit that is available to the firm’s directors and 
officers throughout the fiscal year. If the proxy circular for a firm-year is not available, we code 
the D&O insurance variables as missing.  
M&A data are from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database.  
We require that a) the acquirer is a Canadian firm; b) the deal is completed; and c) an acquirer 
has sufficient (primary issue) stock price data for our event study (200 trading days of stock 
returns prior to an acquisition announcement).8 We obtain stock prices from FactSet. We then 
match our D&O insurance sample with the M&A sample to derive the intersection of 709 deals 
made by 278 firms. The target firms in these acquisitions are primarily from Canada (55%), the 
                                                            
8 Occasionally, an acquirer may have more than one announcement on a day and these multiple announcements 
are excluded for the ease of interpreting the results. 
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US (27%), and the UK (3%). Accounting information is obtained from Compustat - North 
America. 9  D&O insurance and accounting variables are lagged relative to the acquisition 
announcement date. 
In Table 1, we present the distribution of our sample of acquisitions by announcement year. 
As can be seen from the table, the number of acquisitions per year is quite uniform from 2002 to 
2008. Table 1 also presents the annual mean acquirer market value of equity, mean deal size, and 
mean relative deal size (deal value scaled by acquirer market value of equity). The median 
relative deal size in our sample (5%) is comparable to the 6% reported in Masulis et al. (2007). 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
3.  Variables and summary statistics 
3.1. D&O insurance 
As discussed in Section 2, the data on D&O insurance are compiled from a sample of 
Canadian publicly listed firms, which are required to disclose the details of their D&O insurance 
policies in their proxy statements. Following the literature (e.g., Core, 1997; Chalmers et al., 
2002), we use two proxies for D&O insurance: (1) an indicator variable (Insurance) for whether 
the firm has a D&O insurance policy; (2) a continuous variable (Coverage/market value of equity) 
defined as the personal coverage limit of the D&O insurance policy scaled by the firm’s average 
market value of equity in a year. Scaling coverage by the market value of equity is necessary as 
the market value of equity is in theory a proxy for the maximum liability exposure and both 
D&O insurance coverage and damage award are often positively correlated with the market 
value of equity (Baker and Griffith, 2007). If a firm does not purchase D&O insurance, the 
continuous variable is set to zero. 
                                                            
9 As described in the Appendix, some of our accounting variables are winsorized at the 1st/99th percentiles. 
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Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the D&O insurance variables. About 72% of the 
acquirers in our sample purchase D&O insurance policies to protect their directors and officers 
from financial liability in the event that they are sued because of decisions made on behalf of the 
firm. The average personal policy limit is C$46.5mm: this is considerably higher than the 
average policy limit reported in Chalmers et al. (2002), but firms in our sample of acquirers are 
also much larger than firms in their sample of IPOs. The mean scaled coverage ratio in our 
sample is 0.033.  
 
3.2. Acquirer abnormal announcement returns 
We examine the effect of D&O insurance coverage on the cumulative abnormal (market-
model-adjusted) return to the acquirer around the acquisition announcement date. Announcement 
dates are from SDC’s Mergers and Acquisitions database. We use the S&P/TSX Composite 
value-weighted index as the market portfolio and estimate the parameters of the market model 
using returns over the 200-trading-day period from event day -210 to event day -11 (day 0 is the 
acquisition announcement date).  Following the recent literature (e.g., Masulis et al., 2007), we 
compute and report five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the (−2, +2) event 
window.10 As can be seen from Table 2, the average five-day CAR for our sample is 0.628%.   
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3. Acquisition premiums  
We also examine the effect of D&O insurance coverage on acquisition premiums to explore 
the potential channels through which managerial legal liability coverage affects acquirer returns. 
                                                            
10 In unreported results, we also compute 11-day cumulative abnormal returns over the (−5, +5) event window 
and find qualitatively similar results on insurance coverage. 
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Following the recent literature (e.g., Datta et al., 2001), we define acquisition premiums 
(Acquisition premium_4w) as the ratio of the offer price to the target’s stock price four weeks 
prior to the initial announcement date minus one. Acquisition premium data are from SDC. 
Acquisition premiums are expressed in percentage form in Table 2, and the mean acquisition 
premium (Acquisition premium_4w) for the sample is 38.4%.11 Because a substantial number of 
the target firms in our sample are privately held (independent firms or subsidiaries), we can only 
measure the acquisition premiums for about 160 deals. 
 
3.4. Deal and acquirer characteristics 
We also control for deal-specific characteristics that prior literature has shown to affect 
acquirer returns (see Masulis et al., 2007, for a comprehensive discussion). Specifically, we 
control for the method of payment (All cash or Stock), relative deal size, industry relatedness of 
the acquisition, and target type (Public, Private, and Subsidiary). All cash is an indicator variable 
which equals one if the acquisition is fully financed with cash, and zero otherwise. Stock is an 
indicator variable which equals one if the acquisition is financed either partially or fully with 
stock, and zero otherwise. Relative deal size is defined as the deal value scaled by the bidder’s 
market value of equity on event day -11. Unrelated deal is an indicator variable which equals 
one for diversifying acquisitions, and zero otherwise. We classify a deal as a diversifying 
acquisition if the acquirer and target do not have the same two-digit standard industry 
classification (SIC) code. Descriptive statistics for all these variables are in Table 2. 
In our regressions, we also control for acquirer-specific characteristics such as acquirer size 
(the natural log of book value of total assets), market-to-book ratio, leverage, free cash flow, and 
stock price run-up (acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return over the 200-trading-day period 
                                                            
11 As a robustness test, we also follow Wang and Xie (2009) and examine acquisition premiums defined as the 
ratio of the offer price to the target’s stock price one week prior to the initial announcement date minus one (from 
SDC). Because our empirical results from using this measure of premiums are robust to this alternate definition, we 
focus on results using the four-week premium in our analyses.  
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from event day -210 to -11). All these characteristics have been discussed in the literature as 
potential determinants of acquirer decisions and outcomes (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Masulis et al., 2007). Detailed definitions and 
descriptive statistics of these variables can be found in the Appendix and Table 2. 
Because our sample of acquisitions by Canadian acquirers is different from the standard US-
based samples used in most of the M&A literature, in Table 3 we split the sample into groups by 
payment method, target type, and deal size and compare the mean values of acquirer abnormal 
announcement returns.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Acquirers experience positive abnormal returns when they pay for their acquisitions with cash 
(0.88%), while they experience negative abnormal returns in stock-financed acquisitions (-0.15%). 
The difference in CARs between these two groups is in the same direction as found in most US-
based samples of acquirer returns but is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value = 
0.12). As in US-based samples of acquisitions, the Canadian acquisitions in our sample tend to be 
value-increasing for acquirer shareholders when the targets are private or subsidiary firms and 
value-decreasing for acquirer shareholders when the targets are public firms. The differences in 
CARs by target type are statistically significant at the 1% level. Also there is weak evidence that 
acquirer announcement returns for larger deals are higher. 
 
3.5. Univariate analysis 
Before conducting regression analysis in the next section, we first take an initial look at 
univariate statistics to see if there are any broad patterns in the data that are consistent with our 
hypothesis about the relation between managerial legal liability coverage and acquisition quality.  
Specifically, we split the sample into groups with and without D&O insurance and compare the 
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mean values of acquirer CARs, acquisition premiums, and a variety of deal characteristics. The 
results are presented in Table 4. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
As can be seen from the table, the means of acquirer CARs and acquisition premiums are 
consistent with our main hypothesis. Specifically, we find that firms without D&O insurance 
coverage tend to have significantly higher acquirer CARs, on average, than do firms with D&O 
insurance coverage. For instance, the mean five-day CAR for firms without D&O insurance is 
1.42%, while the mean five-day CAR for firms with D&O insurance coverage is 0.32%. This 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 12  We also find that firms with D&O 
insurance coverage tend to pay higher premiums, on average, to acquire their targets than do 
firms without D&O insurance. Acquirers in the D&O insurance group pay an average acquisition 
premium (relative to the target’s stock price four weeks before announcement) of 47.6% while 
acquirers without D&O insurance pay an average premium of 22.9%. This difference is also 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Regarding deal characteristics, the results are somewhat mixed.  For instance, we find that 
firms with D&O insurance are more likely to make unrelated acquisitions than firms without 
D&O insurance. Prior literature has demonstrated that unrelated (or diversifying) acquisitions are 
associated with losses in value for acquirer shareholders (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990). 
However, we also find that firms with D&O insurance are more likely to make all-cash deals 
(instead of stock-financed deals) and deals with subsidiary targets, characteristics that are 
                                                            
12 An alternative potential interpretation of this result is that directors of firms without D&O insurance subject 
potential M&A deals to greater scrutiny (e.g., a higher internal rate of return (IRR) or net present value (NPV) 
screen) because the failure of a deal (and associated shareholder litigation) could subject them to significant personal 
liability. It is, in theory, possible that stricter deal-acceptance thresholds by firms without D&O insurance are not in 
the best interests of shareholders because marginal, but still positive NPV, acquisitions might be rejected. 
14 
 
generally associated with positive acquirer abnormal announcement returns in prior literature. 
Therefore, we will control for these deal characteristics in multivariate regressions to isolate the 
impact of D&O insurance coverage on acquisition outcomes. 
 
4.  Empirical results 
4.1. D&O insurance and acquirer returns 
In this section we examine the impact of D&O insurance on acquirer cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns (CARs) using multivariate regressions.  The main empirical model is: 
 
CAR = f (D&O insurance measures, Deal characteristics, Acquirer characteristics, 
Industry and time effects).                (1) 
 
In Eq. (1), the dependent variable is the acquirer’s five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR (-
2, +2)).  The independent variables of interest are the D&O insurance measures: the insurance 
indicator and coverage ratio.   
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The results from ordinary least square (OLS) regressions of Eq. (1) are presented in Table 5. 
In columns 1 and 2, the D&O insurance indicator variable is used as the key independent 
variable, while in columns 3 and 4 we use the continuous variable (coverage ratio) instead. For 
each set of regressions we run two specifications.  The first controls for a set of deal 
characteristics and year and industry dummies; the second adds controls for acquirer 
characteristics. As can be seen from the table, the coefficients of D&O insurance measures are 
negative and statistically significant across all model specifications, suggesting a negative impact 
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of D&O insurance coverage on acquirer returns.  
More specifically, the point estimates in columns 3 and 4 indicate that a one-standard-
deviation increase in the insurance coverage ratio decreases average acquirer CARs by 
approximately 1.25 to 1.45 percentage points, other things being equal.  Hence, the effect of 
D&O insurance on acquirer abnormal announcement returns appears both economically and 
statistically significant.  
 The coefficients on the control variables are largely consistent with prior literature. 
Specifically, we find that acquisitions of private and subsidiary targets are associated with higher 
acquirer returns. We also find that relative deal size is positively associated with acquirer returns, 
while acquirer size is negatively associated with acquirer returns (column 4).  
 
4.2. D&O insurance and acquirer returns: Additional governance controls 
The results in Table 5 are consistent with the notion that managerial legal liability coverage 
weakens managerial incentives because D&O insurance insulates directors and officers from 
potential personal liability and, therefore, aggravates agency problems. This appears to result in 
lower acquirer shareholder returns. There are, however, other monitoring and governance 
mechanisms that might attenuate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. Ignoring 
these factors potentially creates an omitted-variables problem. In this section, we include a series 
of firm and industry controls in our model to test the robustness of the results. 
Specifically, we include proxy variables for managerial quality, industry competitiveness, 
managerial ownership, and institutional ownership into the regressions. Intuitively, managerial 
quality might affect acquisition outcomes. It is also possible that poor-quality managers cause 
their firms to adopt D&O insurance as an entrenchment device, suggesting that our D&O 
insurance variables might proxy for managerial quality. We therefore follow Morck et al. (1990) 
and proxy for acquirer managerial quality (Managerial quality) with the acquirer’s industry-
adjusted operating income growth over the two years prior to the acquisition announcement date. 
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Following Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000), industry adjustment is based on median 
operating income growth rate in the industry classified by three-digit SIC codes using all firms in 
the Compustat - North America database.13 This proxy variable has been used in other recent 
empirical M&A studies of acquirer announcement returns (e.g., Masulis et al., 2007; Wang and 
Xie, 2009).  
It has long been argued that product market competition plays an important disciplinary role 
on managerial behavior (Hart, 1983). The absence of product market competition allows 
managers to relax and enjoy a “quiet life.” In contrast, managerial slack is less of a concern in 
more competitive industries since the margin for error is thin in these industries and poor 
decisions can be quickly exploited by competitors, jeopardizing firms’ survival and managers’ 
job-retention prospects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Scharfstein, 1988; Masulis et al., 2007). 
Giroud and Mueller (2011) argue that product market competition is a more powerful discipline 
tool than internal governance mechanisms. Following Masulis et al. (2007), we use two measures 
to capture industry competitiveness. The first is based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 
calculated as the sum of squared market shares of all Compustat firms in each industry, and 
higher values indicate greater concentration and lower product market competitiveness.14 We 
define an industry as competitive (Competitive industry) if the industry’s HHI index is in the 
bottom quartile of all 48 Fama-French industries. The second is based on the industry’s median 
ratio of selling expense to sales, which acts as a proxy for product uniqueness (Unique industry).  
We define an industry as unique if the industry’s median ratio of selling expense to sales is in the 
top quartile of all 48 Fama-French industries.  
Institutional investors also play an important corporate governance role.  Institutional 
                                                            
13 Some Canadian firms are not covered by Compustat; however, the US and Canadian economies are broadly 
similar in most dimensions so that firms from the same industry in the two countries face relatively similar 
competitive environments (Morck et al., 2000).  
14 Similar measure has been used in other recent studies such as Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) and Houston, 
Lin, Lin, and Ma (2010). 
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investors are better informed and more capable monitors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Grinstein 
and Michaely, 2005).  As a consequence, the presence of institutional investors makes external 
governance more effective and increases the marginal costs of engaging in empire-building or 
other types of moral hazard activities (Lin, Ma, and Xuan, 2011). Institutional ownership 
(Institutional ownership) is the number of shares held by all institutional investors divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding. Our institutional investor holdings data are obtained from the 
FactSet/LionShares Global Ownership database. Institutional ownership includes shares held by 
professional investment managers.15 FactSet compiles these data using a variety of sources, 
including company proxies and annual reports, public filings by institutional investors, mutual 
fund industry directories, and announcements by national regulatory agencies and stock 
exchanges, as described in Ferreira and Matos (2008). We also control for insider equity 
ownership (Insider ownership) because equity ownership can help align the interests of managers 
with those of shareholders and therefore alleviate the agency problems associated with 
managerial opportunism (Jensen, 1993).16 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Table 6 we present the results from regressions including these new variables. One facet of 
these regressions worth noting is that the sample size is smaller compared to the similar 
regressions in Table 5. For example, in the regression in column 1, the sample size drops from 
680 (Table 5) to 554 (Table 6), and this drop is attributable to data availability for the additional 
variables noted above. As can be seen from the table, however, the D&O insurance variables 
(indicator and continuous) remain negative and statistically significant across all model 
                                                            
15 Such institutional investors include pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, investment advisors, 
and bank trusts. Please see Ferreira and Matos (2008) for more detailed description. 
16 Some Canadian acquirers have a dual-class share structure. In unreported results, we also include an indicator 
variable for the existence of a dual-class share structure in our CAR regressions. This indicator variable does not 
have a statistically significant effect on abnormal announcement returns, and our results on insurance coverage are 
unchanged. 
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specifications.  
The coefficients on the control variables are generally similar to those in Table 5. Of the 
additional control variables in Table 6, the coefficients on our proxies for managerial quality and 
competitive industry are both positive, but their statistical significance varies. Thus, there is 
some evidence suggesting that better-quality managers and acquirers in more competitive 
industries make acquisition decisions that are value-increasing for their shareholders. The other 
additional control variables in Table 6 do not have statistically significant coefficients.17 
 
4.3. D&O insurance and acquirer returns: Instrumental variables 
Endogeneity is a concern in any study dealing with the interaction between governance 
structure and corporate decision-making.  Relative to other studies in the literature, this issue 
might be less of a problem in this context because the primary dependent variable in our tests so 
far is a short-term market-based measure (i.e., returns). Nevertheless, it is still possible that firms 
with D&O insurance have firm-specific characteristics that we have thus far failed to account for 
and that affect both the decision to obtain D&O insurance coverage and the quality of acquisition 
decisions.18 Although it is difficult to completely solve the endogeneity problem, in this section 
we attempt to address this issue using an instrumental variable approach.  
Following the recent literature (Adams, Lin, and Zou, 2011; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 
2011),  we use the industry average D&O insurance incidence and median coverage ratio as 
instruments for the firm’s D&O insurance incidence and coverage ratio, respectively. There are 
two rationales for using the mean/median industry insurance use as the instrument. First, as 
                                                            
17 We conduct a further robustness test by including in our regressions an indicator variable for large deals. This 
indicator variable equals one if the relative deal size exceeds the 90th percentile of the sample. We then interact this 
large-deal indicator variable with the insurance indicator and continuous coverage variables. In unreported results, 
the coefficient on the interaction term is negative but insignificant, and the coefficients on our insurance variables 
are unchanged. Therefore, the negative effect of D&O insurance on CAR does not seem to be driven by large deals. 
18 In other words, it is possible that some D&O insurance purchases are precautionary, in the sense that 
entrenched or otherwise poorly governed managers choose to buy D&O insurance against liability for their empire-
building acquisition decisions in the future. If this were the case, our evidence suggests that D&O insurance 
purchases are a leading indicator for poor future acquisition decisions. 
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Adams et al. (2011) point out, firms in the same region and/or industry may compete for the 
same small pool of managerial talent in the local labor market. In order to attract good managers, 
a firm’s managerial compensation package (e.g., including D&O insurance coverage) may be 
influenced by the compensation package offered by competitors in the same industry or region. 
Second, firms in the same industry face similar business risks and business cycles, and the risk of 
facing shareholder litigation often exhibits industry patterns: for example, high-tech firms may 
be more likely to be targets of litigation in certain periods than other firms are (Core, 2000). As a 
result, industry average/median D&O insurance use will be correlated with a firm’s D&O 
insurance coverage but is unlikely to directly influence the quality of a firm’s acquisitions except 
through the firm’s D&O insurance plan.  
We run two first-stage regressions (not reported, for brevity): one with the D&O insurance 
coverage indicator variable as the dependent variable and the other with the D&O insurance 
coverage ratio (continuous) as the dependent variable. In the former regression, the key 
instrumental variable is the industry average of the D&O insurance indicator variable. In the 
latter regression, the key instrumental variable (IV) is the industry median D&O insurance 
coverage ratio (continuous). In both cases, the first-stage IV regressions include all the control 
variables from Table 6. We use the fitted values from these first-stage regressions as explanatory 
variables in the second-stage regressions in Table 7. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
While the first-stage regression results are not reported, the relevant F-tests of industry 
average D&O insurance incidence or the industry median coverage ratio as the excluded 
instrument are always highly significant (p-values lower than 0.01). We also calculate Shea’s 
(1997) partial R2 from the first-stage regressions. These values of R2 all well exceed the 
suggested (“rule of thumb”) hurdle of 10%. These tests suggest that our instrument is relevant in 
explaining the variation of the potentially endogenous regressors.  
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As can be seen from the table, the empirical results are robust after the instrumentation. The 
D&O insurance measures remain negative and statistically significant across model 
specifications: our main results do not appear to be driven by, or sensitive to, endogeneity. The 
coefficients on the control variables in Table 7 are generally consistent with those in previous 
tables. 
 
4.4. D&O insurance and acquirer returns: Serial acquirers 
In our sample, some acquirers make more than one acquisition during the sample period (we 
call these serial acquirers). Serial acquirers could generate endogeneity in our results because 
firms that are repeatedly involved in M&A transactions are likely to have greater exposure to 
litigation risk and thus have a higher (derived) demand for D&O insurance. Furthermore, 
measuring acquirer announcement returns can be difficult for serial acquirers because pre-
announcement market prices may already reflect the value (creation or destruction) expected 
from repeated acquisitions, and serial acquirers tend to be (or become) conglomerates. Therefore, 
serial acquirers may have both higher demand for D&O insurance and mechanically lower 
announcement returns, suggesting that our key finding might reflect an endogenous relation.19 To 
address this concern, we include in the regressions an indicator variable that equals one for firms 
with more than two deals during the sample period.20 The regressions in Tables 5 – 7 are 
repeated with the inclusion of this indicator variable, and in untabulated results the serial 
acquirer dummy does not enter the regression models significantly and the coefficients on the 
insurance variables are qualitatively unaffected.   
In addition, as a direct way to examine whether our announcement return results hold for non-
serial acquirers, we drop deals from the analysis if the acquirer has more than two deals in the 
sample period. This leaves us with 238 deals by non-serial acquirers, and we replicate the 
regressions in Table 6 and Table 7 for this sample. The results are reported in Table 8. 
                                                            
19 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention. 
20  The number of deals per firm ranges from one to nine and with a mean of 3.7. 
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In columns 1 – 2 we regress CAR(-2,+2)(%) on the insurance variables with a full vector of 
control variables (as in Table 6), while in columns 3 – 4 we employ instrumental variables 
regressions (as described in Table 7). Our conclusions about the effects of D&O insurance on 
acquirer announcement returns are qualitatively similar in this sample of non-serial acquirers, 
suggesting that our findings are not driven by serial acquirers buying D&O insurance to preempt 
future litigation.  
 
4.5. Why are acquirer returns lower for firms with D&O insurance? 
So far our results suggest that firms with managerial legal liability coverage through D&O 
insurance make worse acquisition decisions than firms whose managers are not protected (or are 
less protected) by such coverage. The lower acquirer announcement returns for firms with D&O 
insurance are broadly consistent with two possibilities: (1) entrenched managers with D&O 
insurance coverage overpay their targets, potentially because of unfettered hubris or empire-
building (Roll, 1986). If this is the case, we should be able to observe that acquirers with high 
D&O insurance coverage pay higher premiums to acquire their targets than do other types of 
acquirers; (2) entrenched managers with D&O insurance coverage choose targets with which the 
acquiring firms have low (or even negative) synergies (and this is perceived by the market). The 
lack of synergies could be due to a poor match between the acquirer and target because 
entrenched managers with D&O insurance coverage are more interested in empire-building than 
value creation (Harford et al., 2010). In the next two sections we focus on these two possibilities. 
 
4.5.1. D&O insurance and acquisition premiums  
In this section we explore the effect of D&O insurance coverage on acquisition premiums. 
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The main regression is: 
 
Acquisition premium = f (D&O insurance measures, Deal characteristics, Acquirer 
characteristics, Industry and time effects).          (2) 
 
In Eq. (2), the dependent variable is the four-week premium (Acquisition premium_4w; in 
percentage points) described in Section 3.3. Our results are qualitatively similar if we use one-
week premiums instead. As noted in Section 3.3, we can only measure acquisition premiums in 
deals with publicly traded target firms: as a result, the sample size drops to about 110 
observations in this part of the analysis.21 The results from OLS regressions of Eq. (2) are 
presented in columns 1 and 2 in Table 9. In columns 3 and 4, the coefficients are based on IV 
regressions with a similar instrumental variables approach as discussed in Section 4.3. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
As can be seen from the table, the existence of D&O insurance coverage (indicator variable 
in columns 1 and 3) exerts a positive, albeit insignificant, effect on acquisition premiums. 
However, the coefficients on the (continuous) insurance coverage ratio variables are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting that acquirers with higher D&O insurance 
coverage ratios tend to pay higher premiums to acquire their targets. The point estimates in 
                                                            
21 Announcement-period abnormal returns are significantly lower for acquirers with D&O insurance coverage in 
this (smaller) subsample of deals involving publicly traded targets. Specifically, the mean acquirer CAR (-2, +2) in 
the public-target sample is -1.6% for acquirers with D&O insurance and 0.9% for acquirers without D&O insurance. 
These means are significantly different from one another with a p-value of 0.03. Furthermore, we repeat our CAR 
regressions from Table 6 using the public-target sample. Our result that there is a negative relation between the use 
of D&O insurance (or the level of coverage of D&O insurance) and CARs still holds. For brevity, these results are 
not reported but available from the authors upon request. 
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columns 2 and 4 imply that a one-standard-deviation increase in the D&O insurance coverage 
ratio is associated with 16.4 – 18.3% higher acquisition premiums (holding acquirer and deal 
characteristics constant). The effect of D&O insurance coverage on acquisition premiums 
appears, therefore, to be both economically and statistically significant. 
 
4.5.2. D&O insurance and merger synergies 
In this section we examine whether managers protected by D&O insurance choose targets 
with which the acquiring firms have low (or even negative) synergies. Following Harford et al. 
(2010), we first examine combined bidder and target announcement returns to assess total 
synergies (value creation) for the deals in our sample. Specifically, we compute five-day 
combined (acquirer and target) cumulative abnormal announcement returns (CAR (-2,+2)) for 
each deal. To combine the CARs of the acquirer and target, we use weights based on their 
market values. Again, this analysis requires that the target firm be publicly traded and have 
required share prices for calculating CARs, resulting in relatively small samples. The results are 
presented in Panel A, Table 10.   
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
As can be seen from the table, the mean (median) combined CAR for all deals in our sample 
with publicly traded acquirers and targets is a statistically insignificant 0.63% (0.69%). When we 
split the sample into firms with or without D&O insurance coverage, however, differences 
emerge. The median combined CARs for acquirers with D&O insurance are lower (-0.1%) than 
those for firms without D&O insurance (1.3%), and this difference in combined CARs is 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.  
As an alternative test, we split the sample into firms with low or high coverage based on the 
sample median D&O insurance coverage ratio. Again, median combined CARs for firms with 
high D&O insurance coverage are much lower (-0.4%) than those for firms with low D&O 
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insurance coverage (1.0%). The difference in combined CARs between these high- and low-
coverage groups is statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level.22 
Another way to measure synergies in M&A deals is to examine operating performance after 
the deal is completed. Fu, Lin, and Officer (2010) argue that examination of post-acquisition 
operating performance is potentially a more direct metric for synergistic gains or losses and real 
value-added in acquisitions. We employ two widely used measures of firm operating 
performance: return on assets (ROA) is defined as net income scaled by the market value of total 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. The market value of total assets is the sum of the 
market value of equity and the book values of preferred stock and debt. Asset turnover (ATO) is 
defined as sales scaled by the market value of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Our first test looks at industry-median-adjusted (“abnormal”) operating performance (ROA 
or ATO) after mergers for acquirers with below-median and above-median D&O insurance 
coverage ratio. In pre-merger years, abnormal operating performance is calculated as the 
weighted average of the acquirer’s and the target’s performance minus the weighted average of 
industry-median performance using the acquirer’s and the target’s industry. The weights are 
based on the market value of total assets of each firm at the beginning of each year. In post-
merger years, abnormal operating performance is the merged firm’s performance minus the 
weighted average of the acquirer’s and the target’s industry-median performance, with the 
weights determined by using the market value of total assets of the acquirer and the target at the 
beginning of year -1 (year 0 is the year in which the merger is completed). Industry adjustments 
are based on both three-digit and four-digit SIC codes.  
                                                            
22 We also calculate the dollar change in the combined value of the acquiring and target firms as a measure of 
total merger gains, as in Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004, Table 7). The dollar change is calculated by 
multiplying the combined CAR (-2, +2) by the combined market value of the acquirer and target before the event 
window. A comparison of the dollar total merger gains between the above-median-coverage and below-median-
coverage groups reveals a similar pattern to that based on the percentage combined abnormal return (in Table 10, 
Panel A). For example, the median dollar total merger gain for the below-median-coverage group is +$11.9 million 
versus a median of -$9.9 million in the above-median-coverage group. 
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The results are in Panels B and C of Table 10. In Panel B we use ROA as the operating 
performance measure, and the results indicate a significant worsening of abnormal operating 
performance after the acquisition for acquirers with high D&O insurance coverage, and 
insignificant changes in operating performance for acquirers with low D&O insurance coverage. 
Specifically, median abnormal operating performance in years +1, +2, and +3 is significantly 
below the median abnormal operating performance in year -1 for acquirers with high D&O 
insurance coverage (last row of the table), but not so for acquirers with low coverage. This 
pattern holds regardless of the level of SIC code (three- or four-digit) used to define industries.  
Similarly, the results in Panel C (using asset turnover as the operating performance measure) 
suggest that operating performance worsens for firms with high D&O insurance coverage after 
acquisitions and improves for acquirers with low coverage. However, the pre-to-post differences 
in the last row of Panel C are insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels. We test 
for changes in abnormal operating performance in a more rigorous fashion in Table 11. We use 
regressions similar to those in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992), where post-merger three-year 
median abnormal operating performance (ROA or ATO) is regressed on the combined (acquirer 
and target) industry-adjusted performance in year -1.23 Industry classification is based on three-
digit SIC codes, but the results are insensitive to the use of four-digit SIC codes. Low- and high-
coverage are as defined in Table 10. The slope coefficient on pre-acquisition performance 
captures the correlation in abnormal performance between the pre- and post-merger years. 
Following Harford et al. (2010), we also include controls for the size and market-to-book of 
acquirer, the attitude of the deal, and whether the target and acquirer are in the same industry. 
The intercept measures the average change in the industry-adjusted abnormal performance that is 
due to the merger, and is our main coefficient of interest. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
                                                            
23 Our results are robust to using the post-merger five-year median as the dependent variable. 
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The results in Table 11 are consistent with the conclusions from Table 10. Specifically, the 
intercepts suggest that high-coverage acquirers appear to suffer significant deteriorations of both 
ROA and ATO in the three years following merger completion, while low-coverage acquirers do 
not. Also note that high-coverage acquirers engaging in unrelated deals experience significantly 
poorer operating performance (measured by ROA). 
In untabulated analyses, we also check the robustness of our results to the existence of serial 
acquirers in our sample (as discussed in Section 4.4). We first include the serial acquirer 
indicator variable (equal to one for acquirers with more than two deals in our sample, zero 
otherwise) in Table 9 (acquisition premiums) and Table 11 (change in abnormal operating 
performance). The coefficient on the serial acquirer indicator variable is only significant in Table 
11, column 1, where we find serial acquirers with below-median D&O coverage appear to have a 
higher post-merger three-year median abnormal ROA. The intercepts in these regressions 
(measuring the effect of our insurance variables) are qualitatively unaffected. Second, we limit 
the analysis in Table 9 (acquisition premiums) and Table 11 (change in abnormal operating 
performance) to the non-serial-acquirer sample by dropping acquirers with more than two deals 
in our sample period. The insurance variables still have a positive and statistically significant 
effect on acquisition premiums. In Table 11, we find low-coverage acquirers appear to 
experience an improvement in ATO in the three years following merger completion, while high-
coverage acquirers do not. Due to concerns about test power in this very small sample of non-
serial acquirers with public targets, however, these results are not tabulated. Overall, our main 
conclusions do not seem to be driven by the existence of serial acquirers in our sample. 
In sum, our univariate (Table 10) and multivariate (Table 11) results suggest that synergies, 
whether measured using combined CARs or abnormal operating performance changes, appear to 
be significantly lower in mergers involving acquirers with above-median D&O insurance 
coverage. We also find that high-coverage acquirers tend to overpay their targets (Table 9). 
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These results are suggestive of the cause of the lower acquirer abnormal announcement returns 
noted earlier:  acquirers with high D&O insurance coverage both overpay and choose targets 
with which they have low synergies. 
 
5. Conclusion 
D&O insurance is extremely common in North America. In principle, D&O insurance 
policies protect a firm’s directors and officers from litigation brought by shareholders (and other 
parties) because of decisions made by those directors and officers on behalf of the firm. In 
practice, suits brought are almost always settled out of court within the D&O insurance coverage 
limit. Despite the prevalence and importance of D&O insurance, there is little empirical research 
on the effects of D&O insurance on the incentives of directors and officers, and how those 
incentives shape corporate decisions.  
In this study, we examine the effect of D&O insurance on the outcomes from a major form of 
corporate investment: mergers and acquisitions. Using hand-collected D&O insurance data for 
Canadian listed companies, we find that acquirers whose managers are protected by D&O 
insurance, or carry higher policy limits, experience significantly lower announcement-period 
abnormal stock returns than do acquirers without D&O insurance (or those with low policy 
limits). Further analyses show that there are two channels through which the well-protected 
managers of firms with high D&O insurance policy limits make relatively poor M&A decisions: 
overpayment for the target and low synergies with the target.  
Overall, our results are consistent with the argument that D&O insurance induces unintended 
moral hazard on the part of directors and officers by shielding them from the discipline of 
shareholder litigation. Our study complements existing studies (e.g., Masulis et al., 2007) which 
demonstrate that entrenched, or poorly governed managers who are protected from shareholder 
discipline make poor decisions about major corporate investments.  
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Appendix: Definition of variables 
Variables 
Definitions 
Insurance information 
 
Insurance (1/0) Equals one if a firm has D&O insurance in the fiscal year before the 
acquisition announcement year; zero otherwise 
Insurance coverage The coverage limit on the personal coverage portion of the D&O insurance 
policy in C$mm 
Insurance coverage ratio Limit on the personal coverage portion of the D&O insurance policy/ market 
value of  stock (averaged on the monthly basis in the reporting year) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
 
CAR (-2,+2)(%) Five-day cumulative abnormal return calculated using a market model 
estimated over the period [-210,-11] relative to the announcement date (day 0) 
Deal characteristics 
 
Private target (1/0) Equals one when the target is a private firm; zero otherwise 
Subsidiary target (1/0) Equals one when the target is a subsidiary; zero otherwise 
All-cash deal (1/0) Equals one for solely cash-financed deals; zero otherwise 
Stock deal (1/0) Equals one for deals that are at least partially financed by stock; zero 
otherwise 
Friendly deal (1/0) Equals one for friendly deals; zero otherwise 
Unrelated deal (1/0) Equals one for deals in which the acquirer and the target do not have the same 
two-digit SIC industry; zero otherwise 
Relative size SDC deal value/acquirer market value on the 11th trading day before the deal 
announcement date, winsorized at the 1st/99th percentiles 
Acquisition premium_4w (%) ((Offer price/Target stock price 4 weeks prior to announcement) – 1)  × 100 
  
Acquirer characteristics  
Log(assets) Natural log of book value of total assets in the fiscal year prior to 
announcement 
Market-to-book (Fiscal-year-end market value of equity +  book value of liabilities)/total assets 
in the fiscal year prior to announcement, winsorized at the 1st/99th percentiles 
Leverage (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities)/(fiscal-year-end market value of 
equity + book value of liabilities) in the fiscal year prior to announcement 
Free cash flow (Operating income before depreciation – interest expense – income taxes – 
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capital expenditure)/book value of total assets in the fiscal year prior to 
announcement, winsorized at the 1st/99th percentiles 
Stock price run-up (%) Acquirer’s buy-and-hold return during the [-210, -11] window minus the buy-
and-hold return for the TSE 300Index over the same period, winsorized at the 
1st/99th percentiles 
Competitive industry (1/0) Equals one if the acquirer’s industry is in the bottom quartile of Fama-French 
48 industries’ Herfindal-Hirschman Index in the year prior to announcement; 
zero otherwise 
Unique industry (1/0) Equals one if the acquirer’s industry is in the top quartile of Fama-French 48 
industries’ median selling expense scaled by sales in the year prior to 
announcement; zero otherwise 
Insider ownership (%) The proportion of shares held by company insiders 
Institutional ownership (%) The proportion of shares held by institutional investors 
Managerial quality Proxied by average annual industry-median-adjusted operating income (i.e., 
earnings before interest, tax, and depreciation) growth rate over the previous 
two years (see Morck et al., 1990). Industry adjustment is based on three-digit 
SIC codes, and the adjusted growth rate is winsorized at the 1st/99th 
percentiles. 
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Table 1 
Acquisitions by announcement year 
 
The sample comprises 709 completed mergers and acquisitions made by firms that appeared in the TSE 300 Index between 2002 and 
2008, subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information. The numbers in parentheses are medians. C$mm is 
millions of Canadian dollars. Absolute dollar values are expressed in real terms (2002 Canadian dollars). Relative size is defined in the 
Appendix. 
 
Year No. of  
acquisitions 
Percentage of 
sample 
Mean acquirer market  
value of equity (C$mm)  
(Median) 
Mean deal value  
(C$mm)  
             (Median) 
Mean relative size  
 
 (Median) 
2002 102 14.4 2,718 83 0.17 
   (637) (37) (0.04) 
2003 86 12.1 2,795 102 0.15 
   (760) (49) (0.04) 
2004 106 15.0 2,292 150 0.24 
   (713) (74) (0.10) 
2005 108 15.2 2,993 119 0.14 
   (973) (65) (0.06) 
2006 97 13.7 4,492 146 0.16 
   (936) (51) (0.04) 
2007 118 16.6 5,442 159 0.11 
   (1,249) (91) (0.05) 
2008 92 13.0 5,174 116 0.08 
   (1,541) (58) (0.03) 
Total 709 100.0 3,736 126 0.15 
   (952) (58) (0.05) 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics 
 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The sample comprises 709 
completed mergers and acquisitions made by firms that appeared in the TSE 300 Index between 2002 and 2008, 
subject to the availability of D&O insurance and stock price information. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
   Percentiles  
Variable Mean Std. dev 25th 50th 75th N 
D&O insurance        
Insurance (1/0) 0.719 0.450 0.000 1.000 1.000 709 
Insurance coverage (C$mm) 46.486 76.560 0.000 20.000 50.000 677 
Insurance coverage ratio 0.033 0.0622 0.000 0.014 0.036 675 
        
Acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement return      
CAR(-2,+2)(%) 0.628 6.725 -2.408 0.328 3.375 709 
       
Acquisition premiums       
Acquisition premium_4w (%) 38.390 67.783 12.610 28.080 49.570 158 
       
Deal characteristics       
All-cash deal (1/0) 0.599 0.490 0.000 1.000 1.000 709 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.221 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 709 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.977 0.148 1.000 1.000 1.000 709 
Relative size 0.156 0.281 0.016 0.053 0.157 680 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.405 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000 709 
Private target (1/0) 0.370 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000 709 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 0.355 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 709 
        
Acquirer characteristics       
Log(assets) 7.166 1.865 6.031 6.952 7.972 708 
Market-to-book 1.762 1.014 1.191 1.431 2.002 694 
Leverage 0.209 0.193 0.058 0.149 0.322 693 
Stock price run-up (%) 5.203 50.962 -17.016 -1.222 16.010 709 
Free cash flow -0.002 0.135 -0.029 0.027 0.068 654 
Competitive industry (1/0) 0.128 0.335 0.000 0.000 0.000 709 
Unique industry (1/0) 0.123 0.328 0.000 0.000 0.000 709 
Insider ownership (%) 9.314 15.135 0.201 2.414 11.306 553 
Institutional ownership (%) 35.365 20.508 18.874 34.503 47.926 555 
Managerial quality 0.156 0.656 -0.066 0.056 0.301 590 
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Table 3 
Acquirer abnormal announcement returns and deal types 
 
This table compares average acquirer abnormal announcement returns (CAR(-2,+2)(%)) between 
subsamples based on deal characteristics. A deal is classified as a small (large) deal if the relative size is 
below (above) the sample median. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests. The test of difference under target 
type is private vs. public and subsidiary vs. public, respectively.  *, **, ***: statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 N Mean (%) Difference (%) p-value 
Payment method     
  All-cash deals 425 0.882 1.030 0.12 
  Stock deals  157 -0.148   
     
Target type     
  Deals targeting a public firm 178 -0.721   
  Deals targeting a private firm 262 1.147      1.868*** 0.01 
  Deals targeting a subsidiary 252 1.152      1.873*** 0.01 
     
Relative size     
  Small deals 340 0.366 -0.871* 0.09 
  Large deals 340 1.237                
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Table 4 
Acquirer abnormal announcement returns, acquisition premiums, and deal characteristics 
 
This table reports averages of acquirer abnormal announcement returns, acquisition premiums, and deal 
characteristics for subsamples based on D&O insurance use. p-values are from two-tailed t-tests.  *, **, ***: statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level, respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
  Firms without D&O insurance Firms with D&O insurance   
Variable  Mean N Mean N Difference p-value 
Acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement return      
CAR(-2,+2)(%)  1.416 199 0.320 510 1.096** 0.05 
        
Acquisition premiums        
Acquisition premium_4w (%)  22.941 59 47.597 99 -24.656** 0.03 
        
Deal characteristics         
All-cash deal (1/0)  0.513 199 0.633 510 -0.120*** 0.00 
Stock deal (1/0)  0.286 199 0.196 510 0.090*** 0.01 
Relative size  0.237 189 0.121 491 0.116*** 0.00 
Unrelated deal (1/0)  0.261 199 0.461 510 -0.200*** 0.00 
Private target (1/0)  0.392 199 0.361 510 0.031 0.44 
Subsidiary target (1/0)  0.271 199 0.388 510 -0.117*** 0.00 
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Table 5 
Acquirer abnormal announcement returns and D&O insurance 
  
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of CAR(2, +2)(%) on measures of D&O insurance use. Standard 
errors (clustered at the acquirer level) that are robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial 
correlation are used in computing t-statistics (in brackets). *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year, and industry dummies 
are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Insurance (1/0) -1.679** -2.069**   
 [-2.225] [-2.413]   
Insurance coverage ratio   -20.237*** -23.298*** 
   [-2.765] [-2.872] 
All-cash deal (1/0) -0.053 0.014 0.015 0.286 
 [-0.089] [0.020] [0.024] [0.405] 
Stock deal (1/0) 0.055 0.174 0.241 0.315 
 [0.064] [0.187] [0.265] [0.325] 
Friendly deal (1/0) -1.062 -0.614 -1.004 -0.622 
 [-0.975] [-0.546] [-0.908] [-0.538] 
Relative size 3.031** 2.807* 4.333*** 3.745** 
 [2.187] [1.740] [3.342] [2.411] 
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.085 0.440 0.058 0.514 
 [0.161] [0.744] [0.109] [0.841] 
Private target (1/0) 1.431** 1.344* 1.859** 1.585* 
 [1.972] [1.706] [2.363] [1.905] 
Subsidiary target (1/0) 1.425** 1.633** 1.600** 1.718** 
 [1.986] [2.129] [2.143] [2.167] 
Log(assets)  -0.003  -0.372* 
  [-0.016]  [-1.694] 
Market-to-book  -0.331  -0.542 
  [-0.925]  [-1.414] 
Leverage  -2.968  -1.518 
  [-1.396]  [-0.703] 
Stock price run-up (%)  -0.026  -0.186 
  [-0.041]  [-0.296] 
Free cash flow  1.966  1.563 
  [0.881]  [0.667] 
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.077 0.088 0.101 0.115 
Number of observations 680 613 647 580 
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Table 6 
Acquirer abnormal announcement returns and D&O insurance with governance controls 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of CAR(-2, +2)(%) on measures of D&O insurance use, 
controlling for managerial quality (proxied by industry-adjusted two-year growth rate in operating income), product 
market competition, and insider and institutional ownership. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) that are 
robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation are used in computing t-statistics (in 
brackets). *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), 
respectively. The coefficients of the constant, year, and industry dummies are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions 
are in the Appendix. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insurance (1/0) -2.644*** -3.009***  
 [-2.742] [-2.732]  
Insurance coverage ratio -25.754*** -33.132***
 [-3.113] [-3.561]
All-cash deal (1/0) -0.052 -0.838 0.239 -0.531
 [-0.070] [-0.942] [0.318] [-0.589]
Stock deal (1/0) -0.126 -0.335 -0.027 -0.147
 [-0.137] [-0.305] [-0.028] [-0.130]
Friendly deal (1/0) -0.355 0.395 -0.451 0.231
 [-0.301] [0.317] [-0.372] [0.174]
Relative size 2.338 1.807 3.677** 3.982**
 [1.220] [0.848] [1.979] [1.984]
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.410 0.719 0.469 0.800
 [0.645] [1.009] [0.724] [1.094]
Private target (1/0) 1.741** 1.251 1.989** 1.736
 [2.043] [1.243] [2.202] [1.612]
Subsidiary target (1/0) 1.856** 1.632* 1.930** 1.767*
 [2.286] [1.843] [2.304] [1.910]
Log(assets) -0.102 -0.371 -0.505** -0.898***
 [-0.452] [-1.373] [-2.125] [-3.115]
Market-to-book -0.373 -0.458 -0.613 -0.725
 [-0.975] [-1.065] [-1.496] [-1.540]
Leverage -2.814 -3.645 -1.301 -1.958
 [-1.240] [-1.513] [-0.568] [-0.811]
Stock price run-up (%) -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
 [-0.272] [-0.069] [-0.477] [-0.419]
Free cash flow 1.816 4.573 1.185 4.394
 [0.631] [1.318] [0.406] [1.275]
Managerial quality 0.633 1.279** 0.489 1.200**
 [1.251] [2.366] [0.951] [2.249]
Competitive industry (1/0) 2.602  3.174*
 [1.545]  [1.818]
Unique industry (1/0) -1.872  -1.467
 [-1.314]  [-0.935]
Insider ownership (%) 0.011  0.031
 [0.369]  [1.174]
Institutional ownership (%) 0.014  0.014
 [0.689]  [0.680]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.140 0.131 0.188
Number of observations 554 437 530 416
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Table 7 
Acquirer abnormal announcement returns and D&O insurance: Instrumental variable regressions 
This table shows the second-stage regression results from regressing CAR(-2, +2)(%) on instruments for D&O 
insurance use. The insurance indicator (coverage) is instrumented with fitted values from a first-stage regression on 
industry mean (median) insurance incidence (coverage) based on three-digit SIC codes and the control variables. Shea’s 
(1997) partial R2 is a measure of IV relevance. First-stage F-test is the test of excluded IV in the first-stage regression. 
Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) that are robust to both cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm 
serial correlation are used in computing t-statistics (in brackets). *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Insurance (1/0) -2.264** -3.121**  
 [-1.978] [-2.387]  
Insurance coverage ratio -21.045** -27.145***
 [-2.174] [-2.859]
All-cash deal (1/0) -0.059 -0.835 0.260 -0.499
 [-0.079] [-0.935] [0.351] [-0.560]
Stock deal (1/0) -0.160 -0.323 0.033 -0.106
 [-0.172] [-0.292] [0.033] [-0.091]
Friendly deal (1/0) -0.363 0.405 -0.407 0.262
 [-0.302] [0.317] [-0.325] [0.193]
Relative size 2.374 1.794 3.416* 3.576
 [1.200] [0.846] [1.693] [1.592]
Unrelated deal (1/0) 0.396 0.720 0.435 0.799
 [0.618] [0.999] [0.679] [1.091]
Private target (1/0) 1.748** 1.247 2.004** 1.692
 [2.041] [1.230] [2.212] [1.564]
Subsidiary target (1/0) 1.832** 1.638* 1.956** 1.753*
 [2.253] [1.834] [2.317] [1.890]
Log(assets) -0.110 -0.372 -0.375 -0.744**
 [-0.481] [-1.378] [-1.579] [-2.456]
Market-to-book -0.384 -0.454 -0.532 -0.652
 [-0.999] [-1.060] [-1.286] [-1.406]
Leverage -2.932 -3.586 -1.968 -2.846
 [-1.311] [-1.460] [-0.885] [-1.172]
Stock price run-up (%) -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
 [-0.275] [-0.066] [-0.465] [-0.399]
Free cash flow 1.675 4.612 0.903 3.950
 [0.588] [1.351] [0.309] [1.143]
Managerial quality 0.605 1.284** 0.519 1.227**
 [1.167] [2.293] [1.009] [2.205]
Competitive industry (1/0) 2.611  3.094*
 [1.512]  [1.774]
Unique industry (1/0) -1.872  -1.498
 [-1.311]  [-0.958]
Insider ownership (%) 0.010  0.032
 [0.356]  [1.205]
Institutional ownership (%) 0.014  0.016
 [0.691]  [0.804]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage Shea’s partial R2 0.551 0.555 0.546 0.678
First -stage F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Second-stage adjusted R2 0.091 0.132 0.105 0.155
Number of observations 554 437 530 416
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Table 8  
Acquirer abnormal announcement returns and D&O insurance: Non-serial acquirers  
This table includes only acquisitions by non-serial acquirers. A serial acquirer is defined as an acquirer which has 
more than two deals in the sample. The dependent variable is CAR(-2, +2)(%). Columns 3 and 4 contain instrumental 
variables regressions as in Table 7. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) that are robust to both cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation are used in computing t-statistics (in brackets). *, **, ***: 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
Insurance (1/0) -3.465**  -3.046*  
 [-2.132]  [-1.761]  
Insurance coverage ratio -30.44***  -32.57***
 [-3.086]  [-3.321]
All-cash deal (1/0) -1.307 -1.305 -1.046 -0.957
 [-0.836] [-0.872] [-0.683] [-0.668]
Stock deal (1/0) -0.593 -0.489 -0.227 0.184
 [-0.305] [-0.230] [-0.112] [0.089]
Friendly deal (1/0) 1.953 0.501 2.109 0.681
 [0.812] [0.193] [0.809] [0.253]
Relative size 3.538* 5.372** 3.609* 5.861***
 [1.702] [2.361] [1.815] [2.648]
Unrelated deal (1/0) -0.443 0.04 -0.493 -0.098
 [-0.300] [0.029] [-0.335] [-0.071]
Private target (1/0) 1.66 2.278 1.765 2.19
 [0.967] [1.192] [1.029] [1.155]
Subsidiary target (1/0) 2.198 2.532* 2.366* 2.587*
 [1.525] [1.714] [1.662] [1.731]
Leverage -1.701 3.286 -1.392 4.081
 [-0.416] [0.807] [-0.333] [1.025]
Free cash flow 14.332** 12.532** 14.211** 12.523**
 [2.200] [2.123] [2.248] [2.169]
Log(assets) 0.45 -0.4 0.393 -0.425
 [0.969] [-0.853] [0.856] [-0.948]
Market-to-book 0.749 0.523 0.762* 0.58
 [1.649] [1.321] [1.683] [1.462]
Stock price run-up (%) -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
 [-1.148] [-1.193] [-1.127] [-1.389]
Managerial quality 1.298 1.499 1.364 1.499
 [1.068] [1.256] [1.047] [1.243]
Competitive industry (1/0) 1.303 2.204 1.262 1.974
 [0.724] [1.249] [0.702] [1.168]
Unique industry (1/0) -1.627 -0.741 -1.725 -0.669
 [-0.364] [-0.213] [-0.390] [-0.186]
Insider ownership (%) 0.009 0.062 0.009 0.063
 [0.197] [1.470] [0.186] [1.471]
Institutional ownership (%) -0.018 0.017 -0.015 0.02
 [-0.435] [0.451] [-0.337] [0.528]
Year and industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second-stage adjusted R2 0.241 0.324 0.228 0.322
Number of observations 152 147 152 147
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Table 9 
 Acquisition Premiums and D&O Insurance 
 
This table shows the results from OLS regressions of acquisition premium (Acquisition premium_4w 
(%)) on measures of D&O insurance use. Models 3 and 4 are instrumental variables regressions where the 
insurance indicator (coverage) is instrumented with fitted values from a first-stage regression on industry 
mean (median) insurance incidence (coverage) based on three-digit SIC codes and the control variables. 
Shea’s (1997) partial R2 is a measure of IV relevance. First-stage F-test is the test of excluded IV in the 
first-stage regression. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) that are robust to both cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation are used in computing t-statistics (in brackets). *, **, 
***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
The coefficients of the constant, year, and industry dummies are omitted for brevity. Variable definitions 
are in the Appendix.  
 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)
Insurance (1/0) 7.226 7.228  
 [0.642] [0.348]  
Insurance coverage ratio 263.435***  293.409***
 [2.890]  [3.179]
Log(assets) -3.538 -2.281 -3.812 -2.547
 [-1.005] [-0.648] [-0.986] [-0.722]
Market-to-book 4.888 6.360 4.991 6.620
 [0.876] [1.233] [0.908] [1.297]
Stock price run-up (%) 0.094 0.094 0.091 0.081
 [0.841] [0.771] [0.805] [0.680]
All-cash deal (1/0) 18.901 20.667* 19.138 22.715*
 [1.479] [1.738] [1.383] [1.882]
Stock deal (1/0) 18.771* 17.526 18.443* 17.109
 [1.750] [1.447] [1.851] [1.422]
Friendly deal (1/0) -11.106 -10.081 -11.610 -10.812
 [-0.756] [-0.765] [-0.757] [-0.842]
Managerial quality 3.941 3.114 3.738 3.219
 [0.913] [0.702] [0.870] [0.722]
Competitive industry (1/0) 11.042 9.073 10.667 7.334
 [0.563] [0.508] [0.549] [0.411]
Unique industry (1/0) -15.848 -16.195 -16.331 -15.874
 [-0.911] [-0.925] [-0.951] [-0.888]
Insider ownership (%) 0.428 0.476 0.419 0.478
 [1.184] [1.326] [1.155] [1.377]
Institutional ownership (%) 0.390 0.389 0.402 0.381
 [1.175] [1.112] [1.224] [1.081]
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-stage Shea’s partial R2 0.513 0.117
First-stage F-test (p-value) 0.000 0.002
Second-stage adjusted R2 0.203 0.236 0.201 0.237
Number of observations 116 112 116 112
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Table 10 
Synergies in mergers with public targets 
 
Panel A reports average (medians in parentheses) combined cumulative abnormal returns (CAR(-2, +2)(%)) of the acquirer and target. Weighting is based on the 
market values of the acquirer and target firm. t-tests are used to determine whether a mean (or difference in means) is significantly different from zero and Wilcoxon z-
tests are used to determine whether a difference in medians is significantly different from zero. Panels B and C report medians of industry-median-adjusted operating 
performance after mergers for acquirers with below-median (Low) and above-median (High) ratio of insurance coverage/market value of equity. Year 0 is the year in 
which the merger is completed. Return on assets (ROA) is net income divided by the market value of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year, where the market 
value of total assets is the sum of the market value of equity and the book values of preferred stock and debt (net of cash). Asset turnover (ATO) is sales divided by the 
market value of total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. In pre-merger years, industry-median-adjusted operating performance (ROA or ATO) is calculated as the 
weighted average of the acquirer’s and the target’s performance minus the weighted average of the industry-median performance using the acquirer’s and the target’s 
industry. The weights are based on the market value of total assets of each firm at the beginning of each year. In post-merger years, industry-median-adjusted operating 
performance is the merged firm’s performance (ROA or ATO) minus the weighted average of the acquirer’s and the target’s industry-median performance, with the 
weights determined by using the market value of total assets of the acquirer and the target at the beginning of year -1. Industry classification is based on three- or four-
digit SIC codes. *, **, ***: statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
  
Panel A: Combined acquirer and target cumulative abnormal announcement returns: CAR(-2, +2)(%) 
 
  N All N 
Sample split based 
on insurance (1/0) 
N 
Sample split based on 
median coverage in the 
sample with non-missing 
combined CAR 
Mean CAR(-2, +2)(%) 117 0.63%     
Median CAR(-2, +2)(%)  (0.69%)     
No insurance or low coverage (1)   46 2.25%** 56 1.86%** 
    (1.32%)  (1.03%) 
With insurance or high coverage (2)   71 -0.42% 56 -0.72% 
    (-0.06%)  (-0.39%) 
Mean difference (1) – (2)    2.67%***  2.58%*** 
Median difference (1) – (2)       1.38%**   1.42%** 
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Panel B: Medians of industry-median-adjusted return on assets (ROA) 
 
  Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
Year relative to merger N Low coverage High coverage Low coverage High coverage
-3 56 0.036 0.026 0.032 0.013 
-2 69 0.025 0.033 0.014 0.027 
-1 81 0.030 0.034 0.027 0.031 
0 81 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.034 
+1 81 0.035 0.015 0.032 0.024 
+2 49 0.043 0.021 0.044 0.032 
+3 40 0.019 0.007 0.012 0.017 
+4 28 0.028 0.017 0.022 0.022 
+5 17 0.049 0.015 0.043 0.017 
Post-3-year-median minus -1  -0.002 -0.029*** -0.001 -0.023** 
 
 
Panel C: Medians of industry-median adjusted abnormal asset turnover (ATO) 
 
  Three-digit SIC Four-digit SIC 
Year relative to merger N Low coverage High coverage Low coverage High coverage
-3 56 -0.005 0.038 -0.005 0.044 
-2 69 0.045 0.052 0.043 0.049 
-1 81 0.058 0.050 0.031 0.045 
0 81 0.071 0.074 0.019 0.057 
+1 81 0.074 0.058 0.065 0.051 
+2 49 0.165 0.061 0.176 0.061 
+3 40 0.175 0.026 0.183 0.019 
+4 28 0.236 0.050 0.181 0.039 
+5 17 0.144 0.063 0.240 0.006 
Post-3-year-median minus -1  0.036 -0.048 0.047 -0.029 
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Table 11 
Changes in abnormal operating performance after mergers with public targets 
 
This table reports the result of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback’s (1992) regressions for measuring changes in operating 
performance around mergers, where the post-merger three-year median of the abnormal operating performance (return on assets 
or asset turnover) is regressed on the combined acquirer-target industry-adjusted performance in year -1. The intercept represents 
the average change in abnormal operating performance following mergers. Industry classification is based on three-digit SIC 
codes. Low- and high-coverage are defined in Table 10. Standard errors (clustered at the acquirer level) that are robust to both 
cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation are used in computing t-statistics (in brackets). *, **, ***: 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level (two-tailed), respectively. Variable definitions are 
in the Appendix. 
 
 Return on assets Asset turnover 
 Low coverage High coverage Low coverage High coverage
(1) (2) (5) (6) 
Intercept -0.021 -0.101** 0.325* -0.494* 
 [-0.582] [-2.300] [1.934] [-1.952] 
Industry-adjusted ROA in year -1 0.420*** 0.550***   
 [3.401] [5.003]   
Industry-adjusted ATO in year -1   0.814*** 0.743*** 
   [3.548] [7.579] 
Log(assets) 0.002 0.009** -0.020 0.024 
 [0.572] [2.152] [-1.582] [1.187] 
Market-to-book 0.008 0.011** -0.123** 0.045 
 [0.681] [2.325] [-2.416] [1.674] 
Unrelated deal (1/0) -0.003 -0.060*** -0.080 -0.058 
 [-0.281] [-3.568] [-1.231] [-0.917] 
Friendly deal (1/0) 0.018 0.037 0.127 0.247 
 [0.937] [1.642] [1.677] [1.249] 
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.567 0.596 0.646 
Number of observations 40 41 40 41 
 
 
 
 
